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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is a claim for violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Act Idaho, Idaho Code§§ 6-2101, 
et. seq., for Clark County School District's termination ofits maintenaoce mao, Ronald Ryao Berrett 
when he reported a building code violation related to a gas smell in the Clark County Highschool, 
aod for violation ofldaho Public Policy for terminating Mr. Berrett's wife, Lanie Berrett, the lunch 
room supervisor, at the same time. 
b. Procedural History. 
This matter was originally filed in 2012 in the United States District Court for the District 
ofldaho in Case 4: l 2-cv-00626-EJL-CWD Berrett v. Clark County School District No. 161 asserting 
the following claims under federal law aod claims under state law: 
Ryao Berrett: I. Wrongful termination in violation of the Americaos with Disabilities Act, 
2. Wrongful eviction in violation of the Fair Housing Act, aod 3. Wrongful termination in violation 
of the Idaho whistleblower act. 
Lanie Berrett: 1. Wrongful termination in violation of the Americaos with Disabilities Act, 
2. Wrongful eviction in violation of the Fair Housing Act, and 3. Wrongful termination in violation 
ofldaho public policy. 
On September 30, 2014, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho graoted 
summary judgment to Defendant Clark County School District No. 161 on all claims. 
Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; the Ninth 
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Circuit reversed and remanded as to Plaintiff Ryan Berrett's state law claim for violation of the Idaho 
Whistleblower statute and as to PlaitniffLanie Berrett' s state law claim for violation of public policy 
for terminating her for her husband blowing the whistle on a violation of the building code. 
Defendant then moved the Federal District Court to dismiss the state law claims for refiling 
in State Court because only state law claims remained. The Federal District Court dismissed the 
claim, and Plaintiff timely filed in Jefferson County, Idaho District Court. 
Defendant then filed a motion for smmnary judgment using virtually the same facts that it 
had submitted when it filed its motion for smnmary judgment in Federal Court. 
The Court issued its Opinion and Order On Parties' Cross-Motions for Smnmary Judgment 
(R. P53) and Judgment of Dismissal (R. PSI) in which it disagreed with the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and granted summary judgment to Clark County School District on virtually the same 
facts that were decided differently by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In addition, the District 
Court found Plaintiffs' argument for protecting the wife of a whistlelower compelling, but declined 
to find that firing the wife of a whistleblower contravene's Idaho's public policy for lack of a 
precedent. (R. P53) 
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Reconsider, and the Idaho District Court, in its Memorandum 
Decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider (R. P75) dismissed all of the state law claims, but 
resurrected the federal claims that had been dismissed on smnmary judgment by both the U.S. 
District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The Defendant then filed another Motion for Summary Judgment on the federal claims, and 
the Idaho District Court granted Smnmary Judgment on the federal claims as well. The Idaho 
District Court issued its Final Judgment on August 1, 2018. (R. Pl 16) 
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c. 
Plaintiffs timely filed their Notice of Appeal on September 10, 2018. (R. P118). 
Factual Statement. 
The facts in this case are as follows: 
I. Clark County School District No. 161 (hereinafter the "School District") hired David 
Kerns (hereinafter "Kerns") to be its Superintendent starting in the spring/summer of 2008. Kerns 
held that position until on or about May 17, 2012 when he was forced to resign. (Aug. P. 334) He 
was the interim Superintendent from on or about May 17, 2012 until August 1, 2012. Kerns had the 
authority to hire and fire employees until August I, 2012 (he terminated the Berretts on June 27, 
2012). Kerns Depa. pp. 38, 48, 52-53, 115,116,119. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,i 11. (Aug. P .. 290-
293, 307-308). 
2. Lanie Berrett (hereinafter "Mrs. Berrett") had been working as a cook in the 
lunchroom at the time of Kerns' hire, and she applied for a promotion to Food Service Supervisor 
in May of 2009. Kerns hired Mrs. Berrett for this position starting at the end of the school year in 
the spring of 2009. Kerns performed annual performance evaluations on Mrs. Berrett. Mrs. 
Berrett's evaluations were generally good. Mrs. Berrett received annual raises based upon 
performance in 2009, 2010, and 2012. She did not receive a raise in 2011 because there was a 
District wide freeze on all raises for salaried employees. Kerns Depa. pp. 61-62, 84-85. (Aug. P. 
288, 299-300). 
3. Spending more than the lunch room budget had been going on at the School District 
for years before Mrs. Berrett became lunchroom supervisor. See Child Nutrition Financial Report. 
(B.E.R. 354). In 2009, when Mrs. Berrett took over as lunchroom supervisor, Mrs. Berrett stayed 
within the budget. Id On May 25, 2010, Kerns evaluated Mrs. Berrett's performance in writing. 
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Performance Evaluation. (B.E.R. 356). At that time, if there had a been a problem with the lunch 
room budget, Kerns would have known about it because he received monthly updates on the lunch 
room budget. Kerns Depa. pp. 63-64. (B.E.R. 294). In this performance evaluation, Kerns made 
no mention of a budget problem, gave an overwhelmingly positive evaluation and even praised Mrs. 
Berrett for applying for and getting a grant. Kerns Depa. p. 65. (B.E.R. 295). In 2011, Kerns did not 
do a performance evaluation of Mrs. Berrett, and he did not discipline her for any budget problems. 
Kerns Depa. p. 65. (B.E.R. 295). Mrs. Berrett received a raise in 2012. She remembers the 
performance evaluation for 2012 as being positive, and she was not disciplined. Affidavit of Lanie 
Berrett, ,i 4. (B.E.R. 350). TheDistricthasnotprovided the written performance evaluation for 2012. 
The District admits that it knows that it is common practice in other school districts around the State 
ofidaho to overspend their lunchroom budgets. Kerns Depa. p. 72. (B.E.R. 296). Mrs. Berrett was 
never disciplined for budget overruns until she was fired June 27, 2012 along with her husband, Mr. 
Berrett. Kerns Depo. p. 73, 79. (B.E.R. 297-298). Mrs. Berret applied for and received at least two 
grants to supplement the lunchroom budget. Kerns Depa. p. 74. (B.E.R. 297). Applying for these 
grants was going above and beyond the duties of the lunchroom supervisor, and no other lunchroom 
supervisors at the District had ever done this. Kerns Depa. p. 80-81. (B.E.R. 298-299). At the time 
Mrs. Berrett was terminated, she had over fifteen thousand dollars worth of usable food on hand, she 
didn't waste the food, and she was going into the less costly summer months. Kerns Depa. p. 73. 
Affidavit of Lanie Berrett, ,r 4. (B.E.R. 297,350). In fact, Mrs. Berrett's replacement was able to use 
the food that was stored up and not go over budget in 2012. Defendant's Statement of Facts ,i 14. 
(B.E.R. 102). 
4. In the termination letter Kerns sent Mrs. Berrett on June 27'\ 2012, the reasons stated 
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for the termination are overspending the food service budget and unsatisfactory performance. Kerns 
Depa., Exhibit I 0. (B.E.R. 328). Mrs. Berrett had always received positive performance evaluations 
and had not overspent the Food Service budget in any year. Affidavit of Lanie Berrett, ,i 5. (B.E.R. 
350). 
5. On June 28,2010, Lanie Berrett entered into a Residential Lease-Rental Agreement 
and Deposit Receipt (hereinafter the "Lease") with the District to rent a residential trailer from the 
school district. Kerns Depa., Exhibit 6. (B.E.R. 319-321). The Lease provided that Lanie Berrett 
would pay $350.00 per month in rent, but the district actually only charged her $50.00 per month and 
allowed her and Mr. Berrett to "work off' the rest of the rent each month. Kerns Depa. p. 88, 
Affidavit a/Lanie Berrett, ,i 6. (B.E.R. 300,350). This continued until the spring of20!2 when the 
District unilaterally decided to discontinue giving Mrs. Berrett this benefit because the District felt 
it might affect Mr. Berrett's disability status. Kerns Depa. p. 90. (B.E.R. 301). This did not affect 
the District in any way. Id The District did not discuss this with Mr. or Mrs. Berrett before it took 
away this housing benefit; the District simply stopped giving Mr. Berrett credit for the extra hours 
that he worked. Kerns Depa. p. 91. (B.E.R. 301). Paragraph 23 of the Lease specifically prohibits 
"discrimination in the ... financing ... of housing on the basis of ... handicap ... " On June 27'', 
the district fired both Mr. and Mrs. Berrett. The District claims that one of the requirements to live 
in the District's housing is that the individual must be a District employee. Defendant's Statement 
a/Facts, ,i I. (B.E.R. 96). The Lease does not contain this requirement. See Lease. (B.E.R. 319-
321 ). When Mr. Kerns terminated Mr. and Mrs. Berrett' s employment in letters dated June 27, 2012, 
he required as follows: "Since you are currently using District housing, you must also vacate that 
dwelling by Monday, July 9'', 2012 ... " Kerns Depa. Exhibits 10 and 11. (B.E.R. 328-329). 
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6. On April 10, 2010, Ronald Ryan Berrett (hereinafter "Mr. Berrett") applied for the 
job of maintenance supervisor for the District. Kerns Depa. p. 91, Exhibit 7. (B.E.R. 301, 322). Mr. 
Berrett applied for a part-time job because of his disability. Kerns Depa. p. 92. (B.E.R. 301). At the 
time he applied for the job, he had been volunteering at the district for over a year. Kerns Depa. pp. 
92-93. (B.E.R. 301-302). At the time he applied for the job, the District knew about his disability 
and considered him to be disabled. Kerns Depa. pp. 93-94. (B.E.R. 302). Before Mr. Berrett was 
hired part time, the same position was filled by a full time, non-disabled individual-Randy Wilson. 
Kerns Depa. pp. 94-97. (B.E.R. 302-303). At the time he was interviewed and hired in April, 2010, 
Mr. Berrett told Kerns that he was disabled and Kerns assured Mr. Berrett that they would hire him 
some help for physical duties, and he would only have to call contractors and do light duties. 
Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 3. (B.E.R. 331). Kerns knew that Mr. Berrett had problems physically 
on one side of his body, walks with a limp, has trouble walking and that it was hard for him to climb 
a ladder. Kerns Depa. pp. 99-100. (B.E.R. 303). Mr. Berrett repeatedly asked Kerns to hire help to 
do the physical labor involved in the job because Mr. Berrett was unable to do it due to his disability. 
Kerns Depa., p. 100. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 4. Affidavit of Erin Haight-Mortensen, Exhibit 
A, p. 2, Doc. No. 20-9. (B.E.R. 303, 331, 155). Despite the requests, Mr. Kerns did not hire anyone 
else besides Mrs. Berrett to accommodate Mr. Berrett requests. Kerns Depa., p. 100. (B.E.R. 303). 
Kerns did performance evaluations on Mr. Berrett verbally each year; they were always positive. 
Kerns Depa., pp. 103-104. (B.E.R. 304). Until the terminationletterdatedJune27, 2012, Kerns was 
happy with Mr. Berrett's work performance. Kerns Depa., p. 125. (B.E.R. 310). 
7. In January 2012, Mr. Berrett started getting calls every other day about strong odor 
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of propane in the old gymnasium from business manager (Gayle Woods) and guidance counselor 
(Lisa Richards). He had High Plains Propane come over to check for a propane smell. They said 
their instrument did not pick up any propane odor whatsoever. He was still getting calls from the 
same individuals, so he called Kerns. He told Mr. Berrett that he didn't know what to tell him. He 
called Kerns again and told him he was going to have Sermon Service and Electric come out, and 
he was also going to lock the old gym up. Mr. Berrett started going through master blue prints while 
waiting for Sermon and noticed that the propane tank was supposed to be an 18,000 gallon tank and 
it was only a 6,000 gallon tank. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 6. (B.E.R. 331 ). 
8. In February 2012 Mr. Berrett noticed a unit that sits next to the propane tank. He 
went to the blue prints and realized that it was a vaporizer. Its purpose is to turn liquid propane into 
a vapor which is necessary to run propane appliances. He printed out literature on vaporizers and 
showed the print out to Kerns, but Kerns did not seem concerned. A Sermon technician came to the 
school. He checked the tank size and calculated how much propane it would take to supply all of 
the appliances. He said when he got a quotation ready, he would fax it to Mr. Berrett. Mr. Berrett 
informed Dave Kerns of this and told him he would bring the quotation to him when he got it. 
Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 7. (B.E.R. 332). 
9. Mr. Berrett got the quotation from Sermon on or about March 13, 
2012 and showed it to Kerns. See Kerns Depo., Exhibit 8, (B.E.R. 327). Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, 
Exhibit A. (B.E.R. 339). Kerns wanted to know what they were looking at as far as costs to fix the 
system. Mr. Berrett told Kerns it would probably be 60 to 100 thousand dollars to fix it so that it 
would pass code vessel inspection. Kerns said Berrett just needed to keep quiet about it. Mr. Berrett 
told him again that this was very dangerous, and it could not be ignored. Now that they had Sermon 
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involved, no one would work on the propane appliances until the problem was fixed. Mr. Berrett 
told him that ifhe did not tell the Board of Trustees, Berrett would. Mr. Berrett never heard any 
more about the problem, so he gave a copy of the quotation to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees 
(Erin Haight-Mortensen) and told her he had already gone to the Superintendent with the quotation 
and got the feeling that he did not want to deal with the problem. He also gave her information for 
emergency funding that was available through the state for dealing with immanent safety hazards. 
The quotation from Sermon states that the problem with the propane presents a safety hazard and 
is in violation ofldaho code. See Kerns Depa., Exhibit 8. (B.E.R. 327). Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, 
,r 8. (B.E.R. 332-333). This was the very first time anyone at the School District became aware that 
the propane smell was a violation of the Idaho building code. 
10. In April, 20 I 2 Mr. Berrett wrote a monthly Board letter addressed "Propane Issue and 
Best Way to Remedy Situation," but he never got an ok to move forward on the project. He kept the 
old gym locked. He told the superintendent he could not or would not unlock it until the propane 
problem was fixed. Kerns told Mr. Berrett to unlock the gymnasium so that the children could use 
it. They argued in Berrett's office about it. Berrett asked Kerns ifhe was willing to damage all the 
propane appliances and risk possible danger to people's lives in and outside the school. Kerns said 
he did not know what else to do. Once again Berrett asked if Kerns had looked into the emergency 
funding. Berrett said that he had looked into it, and it was available but they needed to apply for it. 
Kerns did not answer and walked away. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 9. (B.E.R. 333). 
11. In April and May, 2012, leading up the Executive Board meeting of May 17, 2012, 
the Superintendent called Mr. Berrett several times and threatening his wife's job and also saying 
bad things about Mrs. Berrett. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 10, Exhibit B. (B.E.R. 333, 341-342). 
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12. On or about May 17'', 2012 the School Board held another executive Board meeting. 
Mike Holden (Sermon Electric), Randy Mead (manager of High Plains Propane), and Mr. Berrett 
were called before the Board and asked one at a time if they thought that the Superintendent knew 
that the propane problem could possibly cause injury to human life. They all said yes. The next day 
Sherry Mead, who is on the Board, told Mr. Berrett that Kerns had been let go because he ignored 
the safety issue. They just hoped that he would find another job so they did not have to honor one 
more year of his contract. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 11. (B.E.R. 334). 
13. After they testified against Mr. Kerns atthe May 17, 2012 board meeting and through 
June, 2012, Mr. and Mrs. Berrett were harassed almost daily by the Superintendent, Business 
Manager, and some School Board Members. They said Mrs. Berrett was over budget. She did a 
complete inventory and had around 12 to 15 thousand dollars worth of useable stock. Kerns told her 
that it does not look good for a manager to have leftover inventory even though it could be used for 
summer school and for the next year. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 13. (B.E.R. 334). 
14. On June I 8, 2012, Mr. Berrett wrote a Facebook post and sent it to members of the 
school board to report the District's unwillingness to accommodate his disability, frustration over 
his benefits for housing being cut because of his disability, and to express his frustration over the 
retaliation against him for pointing out the safety concern and code violation of the propane tank. 
Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,r 16, Exhibit C. (B.E.R. 334-335, 343). 
15. Kerns was forced to resign by the school board after the testimony of Mr. Berrett, 
Holden, and Mead, but he stayed on as interim superintendent until a new superintendent could be 
hired. Kerns Depo., pp. 116-117. (B.E.R. 307-308). 
16. After he resigned, but while he was waiting for his replacement, Superintendent 
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Kerns terminated both Mr. an Mrs. Berrett by letters dated June 27'', 2012. Kerns Depa., Exhibits 
10 and 11.(B.E.R. 328-329). 
17. In the termination letter Kerns sent Mr. Berrett on June 27'', 2012, one of the reasons 
stated for the termination is that Mr. Berrett was not "keeping lights replaced and in working order" 
and was not performing his duties satisfactorily. Kerns Depa., Exhibit 11. (B.E.R. 329). Mr. Berrett 
was terminated for his inability to change light bulbs and his inability to keep up with the physical 
duties of the job without an accommodation. Id. 
18. In the termination letter Kerns sent Mr. Berrett on June 27'', 2012, one of the reasons 
stated for the termination is that Mr. Berrett was insubordinate. The only instance of insubordination 
referred to by either party is Mr. Berrett's refusal to unlock the old gymnasium for safety reasons. 
Kerns Depa., Exhibit 11. (B.E.R. 329). 
19. In the termination letter Kerns sent Mr. Berrett on June 27'', 2012, one of the reasons 
stated for the termination is that he "ridiculed personnel through social media on the Internet." Kerns 
Depa., Exhibit 11. (B.E.R. 329). The Facebook post cited by Defendant as a reason for Mr. Berrett's 
termination is yet another request for an accommodation, a complaint about the housing 
discrimination, and a complaint about the District's failure to address the unsafe propane issue. The 
post, dated Jnne 18 (2012) states in pertinent part: "I have ran the maintenance Department for Clark 
county school district for 2 years by myself, without any help even though I have asked for it every 
year. .. " and "I am very disabled and I have done this job by myself for 800.00 a month and I feel 
I should not have to take a 300.00 decrease in pay" and "I strongly feel this out of retaliation because 
our Administration did not want to address an issue that could have endangered the lives of 
children." AfjidavitafErinHaight-Martensen, Exhibit A, p. 2, Doc. No. 20-9. (B.E.R. 155). The 
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Berretts were fired nine days after Mr. Berrett posted this and the school board, through its member 
Erin Haight-Mortensen, received it. Affidavit of Erin Haight-Mortensen, ,i 19,Kerns Depo. Exhibits 
10 and 11. (B.E.R. 149-150, 328-329). 
20. Kerns fired the Berretts one month after Mr. Berrett testified before the School Board 
that Kerns knew that the propane problem could possibly cause injury to the students, which 
testimony resulting in Mr. Kerns being forced to resign. (B.E.R. 333-334). 
21. On December 20, 2012 the Berretts filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
in the United States District Court for the District ofldaho in Case 4: 12-cv-00626-EJL-CWD Berrett 
v. Clark County School District No. 161 alleging the following causes of action: (1) That the District 
terminated the Berretts' employment in violation of public policy; (2) that the District terminated 
Berretts" employment in violation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA); (3) that the District 
terminated the Berretts' employment in violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Act, Idaho Code§ 6-
2101; and (4) that the District raised the rent and evicted the Berretts from their housing in violation 
of the Fair Housing Act. (R. Pll-P35). 
22. The United States District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims on summary judgment, 
and then Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
23. Regarding Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett's whistleblower claim, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held as follows: "Mr. Berrett established a prima facie case of retaliatory 
conduct by presenting evidence that: he engaged in protected activity by reporting "a violation or 
suspected violation of law," Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1)(a); he suffered an "adverse action" when he 
was terminated, id. § 6-2103(1 ); and the "close relation in time" between them, among other 
factors, suggests he may have been fired for reporting the propane issue. Curlee v. Kootenai Cty. 
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Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,397 (2008). This is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact to survive summary judgment. Id. At 396 (holding that the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework does not apply to claims under the Idaho Whistleblower Act at the summary 
judgment stage). Memorandum, p.2, Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
24. Regarding Plaintiff Lanie Berrett's claim for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held as follows: "[T]he court failed to address 
Ms. Berrett's common law claim for termination in violation of public policy-that is, firing her 
in retaliation for her husband's statutorily protected whistleblower activity-and should consider 
on remand whether this claim also survives summary judgment." Memorandum, p.2, Exhibit A 
to the Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (Aug. P. 30). 
25. The facts pertaining to the Berretts' termination are contained in the record that 
was before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Aug. pp. 45-492). In a nutshell, the facts as 
contained in the Record and the affidavit of Ronald Ryan Berret in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, filed herein are as follows: 
a. The Berretts both worked for Clark County School District in Dubois, 
ID; Mr. Berrett was the district maintenance man, and his wife was the lunchroom supervisor. 
b. At the start of 2012, there were complaints of a strong propane smell in 
the old gymnasium. 
c. Mr. Berrett called Sermon Electric to come figure out the problem; Mike 
Holden from Sermon Electric gave him a bid to fix a propane tank that was unsafe and had building 
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code violations. See exhibit attached to Affidavit of Ronald Ryan Berrett in Support of Motion for 
Partial Sununary Judgment. 
d. Mr. Berrett delivered this bid to Superintendent Kerns; Kerns told Mr. 
Berrett to keep quiet about it. Wessel Affidavit, (Aug. pp. 332-333), ,i 8-9. 
e. Mr. Berrett refused to keep quiet about it because he feared for the safety 
of the school children; Mr. Kerns and Mr. Berrett argued about Berrett's safety concerns; Mr. Berrett 
went over his head, and reported the problems to the school board. Wessel Affidavit, (Aug. pp. 332-
333), iJ 8-9. 
f. From that time until he terminated the Berretts, Superintendent Kerns 
harassed the Berretts on a daily basis including trying to get them to quit by reducing Mr. Berrett's 
wages and raising the rent on their housing. Wessel Affidavit, (Aug. p. 333), ,i 10. 
g. In the spring of 2012, Mr. Berrett went before the school board along with 
propane contractors and reported that Kerns refused to address the propane problem which was 
endangering the safety of the children. Wessel Affidavit, (Aug. p. 334) ,i 11. 
h. On or about May 17, 2017, school board member Sherry Mead told the 
Berretts that the school board was terminating Kerns for his failure to act on the propane issue, but 
kept him on until they could find a new superintendent. While the board was trying to find a new 
superintendent, Kerns reduced Mr. Berrett's pay, and then he fired him and Mrs. Berrett and evicted 
them from their district owned home in May, 2012 in violation of their lease agreement. Wessel 
Affidavit, (Aug. p. 334) ,i 11, May 17, 2012 calender entry, (Aug. p. 342), (Aug. p. 350), ,i 6. 
26. After the case was remanded to the United States District Court, Defendant moved 
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for the case to be dismissed and refiled in Idaho State Court because only state claims remained. 
Plaintiffs opposed the removal to state court because they feared it would mean redoing all of the 
work already done in the federal court. In reply, Defendant made the following statements in an 
attempt to convince Judge Lodge to remove the case to Idaho State Court: 
a. "Throughout their briefing on this issue, Plaintiffs maintain that the parties 
would, for some reason unbeknownst to Defendant, be compelled to "start this case over" from the 
very beginning if this Court were to decline jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' assertion is false, and misleading 
at best. While it is true Plaintiffs will be required to refile the case in Idaho state court, the state court 
would then be in a position to quickly proceed to the merits of the remaining state law whistle blower 
claim." Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Court to Decline Jurisdiction 
pg 3, Exhibit B to Wessel Affidavit. (Aug. p. 494) 
b. "In the event this case is filed in Idaho state court, the parties will not be required 
to redo what has already been done. Rather, the parties would simply proceed forward on the 
remaining state law claim."/d. p. 4. 
c. " ... they again point to the false premise that they do not wish to "start over" in state 
court and undergo additional delays. There is nothing unfair to either party in declining to retain 
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim in this matter. Both parties would be placed in the 
same position. As has been addressed herein."/d. p. 4 paragraph C (emphasis added). 
27. Based upon the above arguments, the United States District Court dismissed the 
Plaintiffs' federal complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 USC § 1367 (c) for filing in state 
court. (Aug. pp. 659-663). 
28. On May 9, 2017, Plaintiffs timely filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial in 
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Jefferson County, Idaho in which they cited the Court's jurisdiction 28 USC § 1367 ( d) and attached 
the original Federal Complaint as their allegations. Plaintiffs also attached a copy of Judge Lodge's 
decision to remove the case to State Court. 
29. On September 1, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment asking the 
Idaho District Court to rule on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' question: does firing the spouse 
of a whistleblower violate Idaho public policy. The facts related to that motion are as follows (Aug. 
p. 1 -p. 3): 
a. In its Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Defendants submitted 
their 14th Affirmative Defense that "Defendant has not engaged in any conduct that would violate 
or be contrary to public policy." 
b. With the exception of Defendants' 14th Affirmative Defense, all of 
Defendant's defenses were disposed ofin summary judgment in the Federal Courts. 
c.. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the reason Defendant fired Ryan 
and Lanie Berrett is in dispute and is a question of fact for a jury. 
d. A question of law and of first impression in Idaho is now before this Court 
whether firing the spouse of a whistleblower in retaliation for the whistleblowing violates the public 
policy ofldaho.1 
e. 12 of the 45 current employees and employees who worked for defendant in 
1A finding that firing a spouse for blowing the whistle is not dispositive of Lani Berrett's 
claims and damages because there still remains a question of fact whether Ryan was acting on behalf 
of himself and his wife or whether Ryan was damaged by the firing of him and his wife. 
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2017 (26.666%) have family members who also worked for Defendant Clark County School District 
in 2017. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ~ 4. (Aug. p. 22). 
30. After Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant filed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment using essentially the same facts and affidavits that it submitted to 
the US District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case. See Affidavit of Jacob 
S. Wessel in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A: (Aug. pp. 123-
258). 
31. The only difference in the affidavits is that now, as opposed to when the affidavits 
were filed in the Federal Court, the affidavits all contain a one-sentence statement that the school 
board was aware that the propane problem was a building code violation; there is no foundation for 
this statement and no evidence of how they would have known it was a building code violation 
without having the bid from Sermon Electric dated March 12, 2012 and addressed to Mr. Berrett that 
Mr. Berrett gave to the school board after Mr. Kerns told Berrett to keep quiet about it. See exhibit 
attached to Affidavit of Ronald Ryan Berrett in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and Wessel Affidavit, (Aug. pp. 332-333), ~8-9, and exhibit A, (Aug. p. 339). 
32. The Idaho District Court Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, essentially overruling the findings of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. (R. P53-P74) 
33. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Reconsider, and the Idaho District Court dismissed 
all of the state law claims, but resurrected the federal claims that had been dismissed on summary 
judgment by both the U.S. District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (R. P75-Pl 15) 
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34. The Defendant then filed another Motion for Snnnnary Judgment on the federal 
claims, and the Idaho District Court granted Snnnnary Judgment on the federal claims as well and 
issued a judgment dismissing all claims. (R. Pl 16-Pl 17) 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Berretts will address the following issues on appeal: 
I. The District Court erred in denying the Berretts' Motion for Partial Snnnnary 
Judgment. 
A. Firing the spouse of a whistleblower is against Idaho's public policy 
2. The District Court erred in granting the School District's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
A. The Defendant should be estopped from taking a position contrary to the 
position it took before the U.S. District Court. 
B. The Law of the Case applies here, so Mr. Berrett is entitled to a jury trial on 
his whistleblower claim. 
C. It was err for the District Court to take judicial notice that the smell of gas is 
automatically a building code violation. 
D. The statement of a school board member is a statement of a party opponent, 
and it is not hearsay. 
3. The Berretts are seeking and are entitled to an award of costa and attorneys fees on 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-2106(5) and 12-121. 
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III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
"In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is 
the same as that used by the trial court in ruling on the motion." Summers v. Cambridge Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953,955, 88 P.3d 772, 774 (2004). "Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
(IRCP) 56, summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Edged In Stone, Inc. v. Nw. 
Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 180, 321 P.3d 726, 730 (2014) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). "If the 
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted." 
ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,682,302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013). "The Court should 
liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party." Edged In Stone, 156 Idaho 
at 180,321 P.3d at 730. "Inferences that can be reasonably made from the record are made in favor 
of the non-moving party." Hoagland v. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900,907,303 P.3d 587,594 (2013). 
"[W]hen the district court grants summary judgment and then denies a motion for 
reconsideration, 'this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of 
material fact to defeat summary judgment.' This means the Court reviews the district court's denial 
of a motion for reconsideration de novo." Bremer, LLC v. E. Greenacres Irrigation Dist., 155 Idaho 
736,744,316 P.3d 652,660 (2013) (quoting Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276, 281 P.3d 
103, 113 (2012))." PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388,374 P.3d 551, (2016). 
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(A) states "costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party 
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or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." A prevailing employee is entitled to an award of 
reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-2106(5) and 12-121 and reasonable 
costs on appeal pursuant to I.AR. Rules 40 and 41. 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Idaho has decided that protecting governmental employees from termination for reporting 
infractions of rules, regulations, or laws pertaining to public health, safety, and general welfare is 
such an important policy that it warranted a statute. Allowing an employer to circumvent this 
statute by the threat of firing the employee's spouse would frustrate the purpose of this statute 
and discourage employees from reporting these violation. Furthermore, about 27% of this 
Defendant's employees would be chilled from taking advantage of the statute for fear of their 
spouse being terminated - like Lanie Berrett was terminated. This would be a clear hindrance to 
public safety. Therefore, Idaho public policy should be extended in Idaho to protect the 
immediate family members or at least the spouse of a whistleblower. 
This matter was originally filed in Federal Court. The Defendant filed its motion for 
summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined there is a genuine question 
of material fact and that Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett' s claim 
for violation of the Idaho Whistleblower statute. 
On Lanie Berrett's claim for violation of public policy, the Ninth Circuit held as follows: 
"[T]he court failed to address Ms. Berrett's common law claim for termination in violation of public 
policy-that is, firing her in retaliation for her husband's statutorily protected whistleblower activity 
- and should consider on remand whether this claim also survives summary judgment." Wessel 
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Affidavit, Exhibit A, pg 2. (Aug. P. 665) 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to decide whether Ms. Barrett's claim for violation of public policy 
survives summary judgment. This is a matter of first impression in Idaho: Does firing the spouse 
of a whistleblower (who also works for the governmental agency) in retaliation for her husband 
blowing the whistle on safety and building code violations, violate the public policy of the State of 
Idaho? The whistleblower is protected under Idaho Code§§ 6-2101, et. seq., but Idaho has never 
decided whether its public policy protects family members ofwhistleblowers. However, every 
jurisdiction that has taken up this issue has found that public policy does protect family members. 
The effect of not protecting family members would be to invalidate the statute because it 
would allow the employer to indirectly retaliate against a whistleblower by directly hurting him 
financial in firing his spouse. This would cause a chilling effect where no one with a spouse or 
family member working for the employer would dare blow the whistle for fear of a spouse losing 
their job. This would specifically effect Clark County School District employees because 
approximately 27% of employees of the District currently have a family member also employed by 
the district. 
Under the Law of the Case Doctrine, this Court should adhere to the rulings made by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on Mr. Berrett' s whistleblower 
claims, and Plaintiffs are also entitled a jury trial on Mrs. Berrett' s public policy claims if this Court 
finds a public policy protecting her under Idaho law. (Aug. P. 666) 
A. The District Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the Federal District Court and 
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remanded for trial on Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett's whistleblower claim and remanded for the 
District Court to determine whether Idaho public policy protects the spouse of a whistleblower. 
After the Federal District Court dismissed the complaint for filing in State Court, the Plaintiff filed 
their motion for summary judgment asking the District Court to determine whether Idaho Public 
Policy protects the spouse of a whistleblower from being fired because of her spouses protected 
activity. The Idaho District Court erred by focusing on the language of the statute and not on public 
policy, and while the District Court found the Berretts' argnment to be compelling, it declined to rule 
in the Berretts' favor. (R. Pll 1). Itfound that the legislature should make public policy. (R. Pl 12). 
This particular public policy is a matter of first impression in Idaho. 
1. The Retaliatory Firing of the Spouse of a Whistleblower Violates the 
Public Policy of Idaho 
In Ray v. Nampa School Dist. 131, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an electrician for a 
school district could not be terminated for reporting electric code violations to the state inspector 
because this violates the public policy ofldaho. The court held that "[ e ]ven when an employee is 
an at-will employee the employer cannot exercise his right to discharge that employee when the 
motivation for doing so violates or contravenes public policy. MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial 
Hosp., 108 Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 (1985);Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330,563 
P.2d 54(1977). "Rayv. Nampa School Dist. 131, 120Idaho 117, 814P.2d 17, (1991). The Ninth 
Circuit Court of appeals held that there is a question of fact whether Lanie Berrett was fired because 
her husband reported safety and code violations to the school board. Wessel Affidavit, Exhibit A. 
(Aug. P. 665). The motivation for firing her was to retaliate against her husband for reporting the 
safety and code violations. The Idaho whistleblower statute sets forth the important public policy 
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that the statute is meant to protect. When Idaho enacted the whistleblower statute (formally called 
"Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act"), Idaho Code§§ 6-2101, et. seq., it articulated the 
purpose of the Act as follows: "The legislature hereby finds, determines and declares that 
government constitutes a large portion of the Idaho workforce and that it is beneficial to the citizens 
of this state to protect the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action for public 
employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and 
violations of a law, rule or regulation." Idaho Code § 6-2101. Lanie Berrett is in the need of the 
protection of this Act because she experienced adverse action from Defendant as a result of her 
husband reporting safety violations and the violations of a law or regulation - the building code. 
The public policy exception has been protected in Idaho on several occasions. E.g., Watson 
v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hasps., Inc., 111 Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986) (protecting participation in 
union activities); Ray v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 814 P.2d 17 (1991) (protecting 
reports of electrical building code violations); Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274,923 P.2d 981 
(1996) (protecting compliance with a court issued subpoena). This Court has also indicated that the 
public policy exception would be applicable if an employee were discharged, for example for 
refusing to date her supervisor, for filing a worker's compensation claim, or for serving on jury duty. 
Sorensen [v. Comm Tek, Inc.}, 118 Idaho [664] at 668, 799 P.2d [70] at 74 [ (1990)] (citations 
omitted). Thomas, 138 Idaho at 208, 61 P.3d at 565. 
"The determination of what constitutes public policy sufficient to protect an at-will employee 
from termination is a question oflaw." Van v. PortneufMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552,561,212 
P.3d 982, 991 (2009). "Once the court defines the public policy, the question of whether the public 
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policy was violated is one for the jury." Id. Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., 156 Idaho 
574, 578-79, 329 P.3d 356, 360--{i] (2014). The Idaho legislature has already made clear that there 
is a public policy in Idaho that government employees must be protected against retaliation for 
reporting safety violations and violations oflaw. Encouraging reporting these types of violations is 
especially important in a school where our children's safety is at issue. It is therefore this Court's 
duty to decide whether Idaho has an interest in protecting the spouse of a whistleblower from being 
terminated in retaliation for her husband reporting these types of violations. 
Permitting Lanie Berrett's dismissal would have a chilling effect on the public policy by 
discouraging the conduct ofreporting safety violations and violations oflaw. See Teachout, 584 
N.W.2d at 303 (public policy to report suspected child abuse implicated when employee is 
terminated for good faith intent to report child abuse); Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 782 (permitting 
discharge for conduct which conforms to public policy would create a chilling effect on public 
policy by indirectly forcing employees to forego the conduct); Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, 
Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682, 684-85 (Iowa 1990) (public policy for employees to file workers' 
compensation claim implicated when employee is terminated after receipt of workers' compensation 
benefits);Niblo v. Parr Mfg., 445 N.W.2d 351,353 (Iowa 1989) (public policy for employees to file 
workers' compensation claim is implicated when employee is terminated for threatening to file 
claim). In Lara, we said Employers cannot be permitted to intimidate employees into foregoing 
the benefits to which they are entitled in order to keep their jobs. To hold otherwise in this 
context would create a chilling effect by permitting an employer to indirectly force an 
employee to give up certain statutory rights. Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 782. Thus, when the conduct 
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of the employee furthers public policy or the threat of dismissal discourages the conduct, public 
policy is implicated. Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 283-84 (Iowa 2000) 
(emphasis added). If this Court sets the precedent that it is perfectly okay to fire the spouse of a 
whistleblower in retaliation for reporting these safety and code violations, any employee with a 
spouse also employed by the govermnental entity would think twice about reporting these violations. 
The purpose of the statute and policy to encourage reporting these violations would by chilled and 
the desired conduct ofreporting violations oflaw, waste, and safety violations would be discouraged. 
The chilling effect of allowing the spouse of a whistleblower to be fired in retaliation would 
be especially significant in the case of this Defendant. Clark County School District No. 161 has a 
high percentage of employees that have spouses or relatives that also work for the school district. 
About 27% of the employees of the district have relatives (mostly spouses) that work for the district. 
See Affidavit of Ronald Ryan Berrett, ,i 4 and Exhibit A. Without public policy protecting their 
spouses and relatives, the intent of the Idaho Whistleblower statute would be frustrated for these 
employees of Defendant. As a result, our govermnental funds, buildings, and our children would 
be less safe in Dubois, Idaho. In addition, the affect of such a bad precedent would endanger our 
children throughout the State of Idaho. No other jurisdiction that this researcher has found, when 
taking up this issue, has found that there is not a public policy protecting the spouse of a 
whistleblower. It would be extremely bad policy for Idaho to be the first. 
2. All other Jurisdictions when Faced with this Issue have Found 
retaliation against family members to be a Violation of Public Policy. 
a. Federal Courts on Americans with Disabilities Act Claims 
InE.E.O.C. v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 1998), the 
24- APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
federal court in California found that the ADA encompasses third-party reprisal claims. "In 
order to plead an actionable third-party reprisal claim pursuant to§ 2000e-3(a), Plaintiff must 
allege: (I) that a relative or friend was engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) resulting 
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and the 
adverse action. Thurman v. Robertshaw Control Co., 869 F.Supp. 934,941 (N.D.Ga.1994) 
(citing Mandia v. ARCO Chemical Co., 618 F.Supp. 1248, 1250 (W.D.Pa.1985))." Id. 
b. Kansas State Courts 
The Kansas State Courts have articulated the reasoning behind their holdings that 
retaliation against the spouse of a whistleblower violates Kansas' public policy: 
"[ A ]llowing an employer to retaliate against one spouse because the other 
spouse has reported infractions of rules, regulations, or laws pertaining to public 
health, safety, and general welfare would frustrate an important public policy. 
Therefore, we conclude a spouse shall be protected from termination by an employer 
in retaliation for the actions of the other spouse in reporting infractions of rules, 
regulations, or laws pertaining to public health, safety, and general welfare. 
Moyer v. Allen Freight Lines, Inc., 20 Kan. App. 2d 203, 210-11, 885 P.2d 391,396 (1994) 
c. Federal Courts in Title VII Cases 
In Title VII cases, federal courts have held that retaliation against a relative of an 
employee who is part of a protected class states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 
EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543-44 (6th Cir.1993) ("We agree ... that a plaintiffs 
allegation of reprisal for a relative's antidiscrimination activities states a claim upon which relief 
can be granted under Title VIL"); Whittaker v. Northern Ill. Univ., 2003 WL 21403520 at 
(N.D.Ill.2003) ('The Seventh Circuit, however, has assumed, though it has not specifically held, 
that an employee is protected from retaliation under Title VII based on the protected activities of 
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that employee's spouse."); Gonzalez v. NY State Dept. of Correctional Services, 122 F.Supp.2d 
335, 346--47 (N.D.N.Y.2000) ("[B]ecause plaintiff alleges to have suffered adverse employment 
action by defendants because of her husband's complaints of discrimination, she has standing to 
assert a Title VII claim.") See McKenzie v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 362, 
380 (D. Md. 2005) 
d. First Amendment Claims 
Often in First Amendment retaliation cases, the government is claimed to have retaliated 
against the plaintiff for her own speech; but the First Amendment may also be violated where the 
speech that invoked the government's retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, 
but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated 
against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person's speech. 
See, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that "retaliatory discharge 
based solely on [protected speech] by one's spouse is actionable under the First Amendment"); 
Talley v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1797627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) 
(Hurley, J.) (citing Adler to uphold claim ofretaliation against a daughter for her father's 
speech); Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 231,262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1127 (D.Or.2003) 
(Haggerty, C.J.) (upholding claim that defendant's retaliatory "conduct was motivated by 
[plaintiffs] association with his parents' speech"); Agostino v. Simpson, 2008 WL 4906140, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (Seibel, J.) (claim "alleging that Defendants took adverse action 
against Plaintiff in retaliation for [his father's] First Amendment activities"); Serena H v. 
Kovarie, 209 F.Supp.2d 453, 458 (E.D.Pa.2002) (Brody, J.) (upholding "First Amendment claim 
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c---' 
[that] [the plaintiff] was retaliated against based upon her *1303 mother's exercise of free 
speech"); cf Thompson v. N Am. Stainless, LP, -U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. 863, 867, 178 L.Ed.2d 
694 (2011) ("We have little difficulty concluding that if [plaintiffs allegations that the defendant 
terminated his employment in retaliation for his fiancee's filing of a charge with the EEOC] are 
true, then [the defendant's] firing of [plaintiff] violated Title VII."). Lewis v. Eufaula City Ed of 
Educ., 922 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302-03 (M.D. Ala. 2012). 
B. The District Court Erred in Granting the School District's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there is a question of fact wether the School 
District terminated Mr. Berrett in violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Statute, Idaho, Idaho Code 
§§ 6-2101, et. seq .. (Aug. P. 666). The School District chose not to appeal this decision, but after 
the case was moved to state court, the School District filed the exact same motion that it had filed 
in federal court, but changed one sentence in each of its supporting affidavits. 
1. The School District Should be Estopped from making the opposite 
argument it made to the Federal District Court in order to get this case 
moved to State Court. 
In its memorandum in support ofits motion for the U.S. District Court to decline jurisdiction 
the Defendant stated as follows: 
Throughout their briefing on this issue, Plaintiffs maintain that the parties would, for some 
reason unbeknownst to Defendant, be compelled to "start this case over" from the very 
beginning if this Court were to decline jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' assertion is false, and 
misleading at best. While it is true Plaintiffs will be required to refile the case in Idaho state 
court, the state court would then be in a position to quickly proceed to the merits of the 
remaining state law whistleblower claim. 
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Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Court to Decline Jurisdiction pg 3, 
Exhibit B to Wessel Affidavit. (Aug. P. 494) 
In the event this case is filed in Idaho state court, the parties will not be required to redo what 
has already been done. Rather, the parties would simply proceed forward on the remaining 
state law claim. 
Id p. 4 . 
... they again point to the false premise that they do not wish to "start over" in state court and 
undergo additional delays. There is nothing unfair to either party in declining to retain 
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim in this matter. Both parties would be placed 
in the same position. As has been addressed herein. 
Id p. 4 paragraph C (emphasis added). (Aug. P. 494) 
Defendant's attempts to rehash claims that were already decided completely contradicts the 
statements Defendant made to the U.S. District court in its Motion for that court to relinquish 
jurisdiction of the case to the Idaho State Court. 
This is equally true regarding the affidavits Defendant submitted in an attempt to convince 
this Court to re-decide whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a trial on their whistleblower claim. The 
Defendant should be estopped from taking the opposite position now. 
2. The Law of the Case Applies here. 
The Ninth Circuit's Memorandum (Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Jacob S. Wessel in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Aug. P. 665) provides in the footnote on the first 
page as follows: "This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3." Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(a) provides as follows: "Not 
Precedent. Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when 
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relevant under the doctrine oflaw of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion." The 
Memorandum is the law of this case, is res judicata, and must be followed. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has long held that the "[j]udgment of a proper court puts an end 
to all further litigation on account of the same matter, and becomes the law of the case, which 
cannot be changed or altered, even by consent of parties, and is not only binding on them, but on 
courts and juries, ever afterwards, as long as it shall remain in force and unreversed." Village of 
Heyburn v. Security Savings & Trust Co., 55 Idaho 732, 49 P.2d 258, (1935). That court held that 
"a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the parties and their privies as to 
any question actually or directly in issue, which was passed upon or determined by the court. (South 
Boise Water Co. v. McDonald, 50 Idaho 409,296 P. 591; Rogers v. Rogers, 42 Idaho 158, 
243 P. 655; Marshall v. Underwood, 38 Idaho 464,221 P. 1105.)" Id 
In addition, the doctrine of res judicata prohibits this court from re-deciding the Defendant's 
motion. The Idaho Supreme court held that "[i]n the first opinion the district court correctly 
observed that substantially all of Stuart's claims had been raised in the direct appeal, State v. Stuart, 
110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985), and thus were resjudicata." Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,801 
P.2d 1216, (1990). Again, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the decision ofan appeals court on 
remand: "In Alnmet I, the Court of Appeals found that the lease agreement between the parties 
contained an implied covenant to actively mine the leased property. Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing 
Co., 112 ldaho 44 I, 732 P.2d 679 (Ct.App.1986). The time for appeal on this issue has long passed 
and it is, therefore, res judicata as to the implied covenant to mine in this particular case. See 
Boundary County, Idaho v. Woldson, 144 F.2d 17 (9th Cir.1944), cert. den., 324 U.S. 843, 65 S.Ct. 
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678, 89 L.Ed. 1405 (1945). As we stated in Insurance Assocs. Corp. v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 948, 782 
P.2d 1230 (1989): Accordingly, the facts having been decided, they are final, they have become the 
law of the case, and the Court of Appeals' pronouncement must be adhered to, both in the trial court 
and on subsequent appeal. Id. at 116 Idaho 950-51, 782 P.2d at 1232-33; see also Airstream, Inc. v. 
CIT Fin. Servs., Inc., 115 Idaho 569, 768 P.2d 1302 (1988); Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 110 
Idaho 871, 719 P.2d 1131 (1986); Suitts v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 110 Idaho 15, 713 P.2d 
1374 (1985). We therefore hold as the law in this case, that the lease agreement between the parties 
contains an implied covenant to actively mine the leased premises." Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing 
Co., 119 Idaho 946, 812 P.2d 253, (1991). The Defendant has chosen not to appeal the decision of 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and instead petitioned for this matter to be remanded to state 
court to resolve the remaining issues. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is now the law of this case and 
is res judicata as to all of those issues ruled upon by the Ninth Circuit. The Motion for Summary 
Judgment has been ruled upon by the Ninth Circuit, so it would be improper for this Court to re-
decide those issues. 
The Ninth Circuit's Memorandum represents years of work done by both parties. Based 
upon the size of the Record before it and upon the oral argument the parties underwent in Seattle, 
Washington in March of 2017, the Ninth Circuit undoubtedly had all of the information it 
needed to competently rule on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled in favor of Defendant on some claims related to the ADA and FHA, and it ruled in 
favor of Plaintiffs on the claims at issue in this matter. It would be contrary to the doctrines oflaw 
of the case and res judicata for this Court to reevaluate the decisions already made in this case. If 
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the Defendant wants to open up all issues for another review by the Idaho District Court, Plaintiffs 
are willing to do so as long as they also get another chance to convince this Court that all of their 
claims, including their ADA and FHA claims survive summary judgment. This would be the only 
equitable way to redo the work that has already been done, but it is not the appropriate way to handle 
this matter. The case law is clear that the doctrines oflaw of the case and equitable estoppel do not 
allow another bite of the apple. 
In its Order and Opinion on Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (R. P59), Idaho 
District Court correctly cited the Idaho law on the doctrine of Law of the Case. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated in relevant part: "Where an appellate court states a principle of law in deciding a 
case, that rule becomes the law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same." Sun Valley Ranches Inc. v. 
Prairie Power Co-op, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129 856 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). The 
Court then cites to an Idaho Supreme Court decision, State v. McNeely, 118 Idaho 104, 106, 794 P .2d 
1160, 1162 for the proposition that the Law of the Case doctrine is the same as stare decisis, 
requiring the decision to be treated as merely persuasive authority and not binding. Plaintiffs request 
that this Court reconsider this interpretation of the McNeely decision. (R. P61) 
In McNeely, an Idaho District Court was asked to decide whether to suppress statements 
made by McNeely to Detective Zane Jensen after finding that the Miranda warnings given to 
McNeely did not adequately advise him of his rights. The District Court stated that it felt 
"compelled" to follow the pronouncements of the Ninth Circuit in prior Miranda decisions, not 
decisions regarding McNeely. The question the Idaho Supreme Court decided in McNeely is 
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whether a District Court must follow other Ninth Circuit's decisions on the same issue of law --
basically whether Ninth Circuit law is precedent in Idaho. McNeely has no application to the 
doctrine of the Law of Case. The question now before this Court is an entirely different question --
must this Court follow decisions by the Ninth Circuit in this exact case. The Idaho Supreme Court 
cases that Plaintiffs cited in their briefing, and the Idaho Court of Appeals decision that this Court 
cited in its opinion are about the Law of the Case -- when an appellate court makes a decision, courts 
in the same case are bound by that decision unless a timely appeal is filed. McNeely does not address 
the Law of the Case doctrine. 
Again, after Plaintiff pointed the error of using McNeely to analyze this issue on the basis of 
stare decisis, instead of the basis of the correct doctrine of Law of the Case, the Idaho District Court 
again cited to McNeely in its Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. (R. P86, 
footnotes 69-72). This was error. 
Even ifit was proper for the Court to reevaluate the Ninth Circuit's decision, the affidavits 
show that there is at least a genuine question of material fact whether Kerns terminated the Berretts, 
reduced their pay, and illegally evicted them from their home in retaliation for their reporting of 
building code and safety violations to the school board over the superintendent's objection and 
instruction to keep quiet about the violations. 
3. Even if the Law of Case did not Apply there are Questions of Fact 
remaining, so Summary Judgment would not be appropriate. 
a. The newly Filed Affidavit of David Kerns Contradicts itself and 
his Deposition Testimony 
In its Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
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Judgment, p.2, ,i 2-3, (Aug. P. 615). Defendant states as follows: 
Id. 
3. Significantly, during oral argument the Ninth Circuit focused its questioning on 
whether there was any evidence in the record before it that the District was aware the 
propane leak was a violation oflaw. See Hall Aff., Ex. A, 28: 20-32:27.2 
4. Defendants had submitted multiple affidavits containing undisputed evidence that 
the District was aware of the propane leak beginning well before Mr. Berrett alleges to 
have "blown the whistle" in March of 2012. Indeed, the District was aware of the 
propane leak beginning in January of 2012 and was diligently striving to remedy the 
issue. See Woods Aff., ,i 7; Haight-Mortensen Aff., ,i 5; Kerns Aff., ,i 3. 
The affidavits of David Kerns, Gayle Woods, and Erin Haight-Mortensen were submitted 
to the US District Court and are part of the Record that was before the Ninth Circuit. The affidavits 
Defendant submitted to the Idaho District Court each are identical to the ones in the Ninth Circuit 
record (regarding the whistleblower claim) with the exception of one sentence Defendant has now 
added to the affidavits. The added sentence is similar in each of the three affidavits; in Kerns' 
affidavit it states, "Beginning in January 2012, we were working to address the propane issue 
because I, along with the board, was aware that the leak in the propane system was a building code 
violation." (Compare the Aug. P. 126, § 8 of the original Affidavit of David Kerns filed on 
November 20, 2013 with Aug. P. 563, §_ 3 of the new Affidavit of David Kerns filed on September 
14, 2017 .) It is clear that Defendant realized, after losing before the Ninth Circuit, that it was 
missing an element of its defense: it needed to prove that it knew of the building code violation 
before Berrett reported it. It simply added this fact, although it contradicts the original affidavits, 
to try to convince this Court to essentially overrule the Ninth Circuit. Unfortunately for Defendant, 
2Defendant is actually asking this Court to review the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and overrule them. The fact that Defendant is submitting this shows that it thinks 
the federal case is the same case and has precedential value, ie. law of the case and res judicata. 
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this new sentence contradicts both the sentence after it in the paragraph and the sworn deposition 
testimony of Mr. Kerns. 
In Kerns' new affidavit, Kerns states in paragraph 3 that the District was "aware that the 
leak in the propane system was a building code violation." Then, in the same paragraph, he states 
that "[t]hroughout the winter we had repeated service calls from both Sermon Service & Electirc 
("Sermon Electric") and High Plains Propane. On each occasion, neither companies' 
instrumentation was able to identify any propane leaks." Kern Affidavit, p. 2, ,r 3 ( emphasis 
added), (Aug. P. 563). How could Kerns and the District be aware of propane leaks when no 
instrumentation could identify any propane leaks? This last sentence was also in Kerns' original 
affidavit before the Ninth Circuit. ( Aug. P. 126) It is clear from this apparent contradiction that the 
District did not even know there was a leak in the propane system, let alone that there was a building 
code violation before Berrett presented the District with the letter stating that there was a code 
violation. 
Further, the new sentence in these affidavits, contradicts Kerns' sworn deposition testimony. 
On November 19, 2013, Plaintiffs took the deposition of Superintendent David Kerns. In referring 
to conversations between Plaintiff Ronald Ryan Berrett and Mr. Kerns, Kerns stated as follows: 
Q. Did he express concerns about the safety of the gym? 
A. I don't remember his specific concerns about the safety, but he was worried about the 
propane. 
Q. Okay. Were you still using the old gymnasium? 
A. We continued to use it through the month of February and then decided to close it 
after that. 
Q. And why did you decide to close it? 
A. The appliances just weren't working, and it was very cold. 
Q. Just it was cold? 
A. Yeah. 







Was it (sic) at any time a safety issue in your mind? 
Not that I'm aware of. 
Were you aware that the propane tanks met the Idaho Code? 
No. I did not. 
Did you become aware that the propane tanks were not up to code at some point? 
Ryan brought up the problem with the vaporizer. 
Deposition of David Kerns, pp. 105, I. 16 -106, I. 15 Exhibit A to Wessel Affidavit. (Aug. P. 305). 
The Idaho District Court should have declined to re-decide Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment pursuant to the doctrines oflaw of the case and res judicata, but even if the Idaho District 
Court did not err in re-deciding whether there is a question of fact on Plaintiffs' whistleblower claim, 
there remain significant questions of fact on all elements of Plaintiffs claim, so Plaintiffs are entitled 
to a jury trial on this claim. 
The Idaho District Court, wanting to grant summary judgment to the School District, dealt 
with the above contradictions in the School District's new affidavits by essentially taking judicial 
notice that the smell of gas automatically means that there is a building code violation. This was 
error. 
b. The District Court erred by taking judicial notice that the smell 
of gas is automatically a building code violation. 
The District Court's disagreement with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' finding that there 
is a genuine question of fact whether Mr. and Mrs. Berrett were terminated for blowing the whistle 
on a building code violation basically boils down to its opinion that Mr. Berrett is not a 
whistleblower because any time the smell of gas is present, there must be a building code violation. 
This was not based upon any evidence; it was simply the District Court's opinion or "judicial 
notice." Taking judicial notice in this situation was error. 
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The Idaho District Court seemed to understand that a violation of Idaho law triggers a 
whistleblower action, and simply a "propane problem" would not be enough to trigger the statute. 
In oral argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, the Plaintiffs attorney and the Idaho District 
Court had an exchange regarding this standard: 
"THE COURT: I think the term was "violation of law," not exactly the propane problem; 
correct? 
MR. WESSEL: Right. Not a-a propane problem that was a violation ofldaho Code. It has 
to - because there has - to trigger the statute, it can't just be that we know of a problem. It has to 
be a violation ofldaho Code. 
THE COURT: Correct." 
(Tr. 99). 
The Court clearly knew that a violation of law was needed for a whistleblower action to 
commence. Knowledge of a propane smell was not enough. Therefore, in order to grant summary 
judgment to the School District, the Idaho District Court needed to find that the School District not 
only knew about a propane problem from the odor, but also knew that this odor was a building code 
violation. Having no evidence in its record, the only way to do this was to take judicial notice that 
a propane odor is a building code violation. 
Idaho Rules ofEvidence Rule 20 I (b) defines the kinds of facts that may be judicially noticed 
as follows: "The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because 
it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and 
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." In Brazier v. 
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Brazier, 111 Idaho 692, 726 P.2d 1143, (App. 1986), the parties offered no evidence regarding the 
likely evolution of the children's needs or parental resources. Rather, the magistrate, acting sua 
sponte, stated in his memorandum decision that "[a]s [the children] reach their teenage years it will 
undoubtedly become more expensive to maintain them regardless of inflation." In Brazier, the 
appellant argued that in essence, the judge "took judicial notice, as a matter of common knowledge, 
that it cost[s] more to raise children who are ages 14 and 12 and that a child's needs are more 
expensive at those ages than for children who are only six and eight." Brazier, 111 Idaho at 700. 
The Appeals Court held that "[j]udicial notice is a mechanism enabling a judge to excuse the 
party having the burden of establishing a fact from producing formal proof of that fact. E. CLEARY, 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 328 (1984). The mechanism has its limits. A judicially noticed 
fact must be free from reasonable dispute because it is either (I) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot readily be questioned. I.R.E. 20 I; see generally City of Lewiston 
v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322,420 P.2d 805 (1966)." The court found that while the magistrate's argument 
about the costs of children going up with age is plausible, they are "not prepared to say it would be 
beyond dispute in every case." Brazier, 111 Idaho at 700. The court then reversed the part of the 
magistrate judge's decision that provided a future adjustment of child support. Id. 
Mr. Berrett stated in his affidavit that he investigated a propane smell in the gym at the 
school; he called Mike Holden of Sermon Service and Electric to come check it out, and Mr. Holden 
sent a letter (Aug. P. 339) to Mr. Berrett describing the reasons that the propane system was in 
violation ofldaho Building Code. (It had been originally constructed with a propane tank that is at 
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least 3 times too small for the system). Mr. Berrett then presented this letter to Superintendent 
Kerns. Kerns told Berrett to keep quiet about it. Berrett then went over Kern's head to the school 
board to report the building code violation. In its Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion to 
Reconsider, pp. 31-32, the Idaho District Court found that Mr. Berrett was not a whistleblower. The 
Idaho District Court held: 
Certainly, the statute offers protection to employees who report "a violation or 
suspected violation of a law" and it is undisputed that the propane leak was a 
violation of law; however, there was nothing to report for purposes of the Act 
because the District already knew about the problem and was working to fix it. 
Therefore, Ryan has failed to establish that any of the actions described above 
constituted protected activity. 
(R. P105-P106). 
The Idaho District Court repeatedly refers to "propane leaks" in its opinion, but this misstates 
the record. For example in the Affidavit of David Kerns, ,i,i 8 and 10, Mr. Kerns states as follows: 
8. In approximately January 2012, I became aware of several reports of a propane odor 
in the old gymnasium. Among other teachers, the District Business manager, Gayle Wood, 
specifically stated that she smelled the propane odor. I immediately notified the School 
Board of the issue and we called out service companies to identify the problem. Throughout 
the winter we had repeated service calls from both Sermon Service & Electric ("Sermon 
Electric") and High Plains Propane. On each occasion, neither companies' 
instrumentation was able to identify any propane leaks. Because the problem could not 
be isolated, it could not be fixed .... 
IO. In approximately May 2012, Sermon Service & Electric performed a pressure test on 
the propane system to determine where the problem existed. It is my understanding that 
Sermon Service & Electric was able to determine that there were small micro leaks at the 
pipefittings. It was also determined that various other upgrades to the system were necessary. 
(Aug P. 126) (Emphasis Added). 
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Despite the Idaho District Court's repeated claims throughout its Memorandum Decision on 
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider that the School District knew about "propane leaks" as early as 
January, 2012, the record is undisputed that the School District did not find any "leaks" until May, 
2012. This was three months after Mr. Berrett approached Mr. Kerns with the letter from Mike 
Holden of Sermon Service and Electric dated March 12, 2012 when Mr. Kerns told Berrett to keep 
quiet about the building code violation involving the propane tank that had been too small when 
installed. (Aug. P. 339). It is undisputed in the record that this letter represented the very first time 
the School District found out that the propane odor violated Idaho law. Mr. Kerns said as much in 
his deposition testimony. (Aug. P. 305). 
It appears that the District Court felt that "smell of gas equals building code violation" is a 
fact generally known in Idaho. When the District Court was asked in oral argument which provision 
of the building code was violated, the District Court judge did not know. 
MR. WESSEL: And so for the first time in your record, in their record, the first time they 
found out about this violation ofldaho Code is that March I 2th letter to Ryan Berrett that he 
gave to Mr. Kerns. And -
THE COURT: Well, but that's-and I guess that was part of the question. The argument is 
is propane in a school gym a violation of law? People knew about that in January. 
MR. WESSEL: Right. 
THE COURT: Now, they didn't know that it was a violation oflaw that the tank was too 
small. I think your argument that it occurred - or the vaporizer, specifically. 
But I guess my question is the clarifying part of this is that the violation of law was known 
when the propane was in the gym. I mean, if there was a propane - if we smelled propane 
in this courtroom right now -
MR. WESSEL: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: - I'm going to assume that's a violation of law to have a propane leak in an 
open courtroom while we're trying to hold court. 
MR. WESSEL: But what Idaho Code is it a violation of? 
THE COURT: I don't know. I would be happy to look it up. 
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MR. WESSEL: No. You would have to calla professional to tell you that this is violating the 
code, the building code. You know, you wouldn't know that's a violation. And, in fact, Mr. 
Hall repeats over and over, again we knew of a propane leak in January. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. WESSEL: All they knew was a propane smell. And they had people coming in and they 
could find no leak. 
(TR. p. 99. I. 8- p. 100 I. 18). 
THE COURT: I guess that's where I am struggling, because it's a violation to have propane 
in a school gym. I mean, I don't have to look - and if I'm on a school board, and I'm in a 
gym and I smell propane, I don't need to look up the state statute to say, "This is a problem. 
This is a violation." And to start acting upon it. And, I guess, that's my question. 
MR. WESSEL: Well, I mean, this is summary judgment. 
THE COURT: True. 
MR. WESSEL: And so we have an affidavit (sic) from Mr. Kerns saying that he didn't know 
that it was an Idaho Code Violation until Ryan told him. 
THE COURT: Okay 
(TR. p. 106, II. 4-17). 
Neither the School District nor the Idaho District Court have pointed to any specific provision 
of the Idaho Building Code or Idaho Law that is violated by the smell of propane in a school gym. 
On the other hand, in his letter to Ryan Berrett dated March 12, 2012, Randy Mead of Sermon 
Service and Electric stated that "[p]er July I, 2011, tank has not been legal and brought up to code." 
(Aug. P. 339). The firsttime anyone at the School District saw this letter was when Mr. Berrett took 
it to Kerns and then to the School Board when Kerns told Berrett to keep quiet about it. 
It appears that the Idaho District Court is conflating a building code violation with a 
maintenance issue. A leaky pipe that does not leak at the time of installation has either corroded 
over time or was damaged in some way. This means that it needs to be repaired, replaced, tightened, 
or adjusted. It does not automatically mean that it violates some law. By analogy, one could look 
to other services that could fail. If the light doesn't come on in your house, is it automatically a 
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building code violation? If your faucet drips, is it automatically a building code violation? If your 
gas fireplace doesn't turn on, is it automatically a building code violation? I think the answer to 
these questions is emphatically a "maybe." It is not common knowledge whether these things violate 
some law, so it would be improper for a court to take judicial notice that they do. It would especially 
be improbable to believe that members of a school board, who are not trained in the law or the 
building code, would know that this odor violated the building code. This is especially true when 
the Superintendent (who made the decision to fire Mr. and Mrs. Berrett) testified in his deposition 
that he did not know the smell was a building code violation until Mr. Berrett told him so. (Aug. P. 
305). 
Furthermore, even if the District Court could take judicial notice that the smell of gas is 
automatically a building code violation, (which is improper), the School District asked Mr. Berrett 
to testify during a school board meeting about Mr. Kerns' failure to protect the safety of the school 
children. On or about May 17'\ 2012 the School Board held another executive Board meeting. Mike 
Holden (Sermon Electric), Randy Mead (manager of High Plains Propane), and Mr. Berrett were 
called before the Board and asked one at a time if they thought that the Superintendent knew that the 
propane problem could possibly cause injury to human life. They all said yes. The next day Sherry 
Mead, who is on the School Board, told Mr. Berrett that Kerns had been let go because he ignored 
the safety issue. They just hoped that he would find another job so they did not have to honor one 
more year of his contract. This statement is supported by a contemporaneous calendar provided by 
Mr. Berrett in his affidavit. Affidavit of Ryan Berrett, ,i 11. (Aug. P. 334), Exhibit "B" (Aug. P. 
342). 
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The Idaho District Court found that Sherry Mead's statement that the School Board asked 
Kerns to resign based upon Mr. Berrett's testimony regarding Kerns' refusal to address the propane 
smell is hearsay. The Idaho District Court erred in finding that Sherry Mead's statement is hearsay. 
c. A statement of a school board member is not hearsay. 
I.R.E. Rule 801 ( d)(2) provides that statements of a Party-Opponent are not hearsay if"[ t]he 
statement is offered against an opposing party and: 
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity; 
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true; 
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject; 
(D) was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that 
relationship and while it existed; or 
(E) was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The statement must be considered but does not by itself establish the declarant' s authority 
under (C); the existence or scope of the relationship under (D); or the existence of the conspiracy or 
participation in it under (E)." 
Here, this statement of a school board member is being offered against the School District 
and was made by a school board member who is (A) an individual in a representative capacity and/or 
(D) the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it 
existed. Therefore, under the last paragraph in Rule 801, the statement must be considered. It was 
therefore error for the Idaho District Court to refuse to consider this statement. 
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Idaho case law supports considering Sherry Mead's statement. In McGill v. Frasure, 117 
Idaho 598, 790 P.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1990), the Court of Appeals found that a statement made by a 
bouncer at a bar could be admitted as an admission of a party opponent under Rule 801. A school 
board member has a least as much authority to speak for the School District as a bouncer has to 
speak for the bar. Indeed, if a school board member is not an agent of a school district, it is hard to 
imagine who would be a school district's agent. Sherry Mead's statement should have been 
considered. If it had been considered, the evidence would be that Mr. Berrett testified before the 
School Board that Kerns had ignored a violation of the building code and told Mr. Berrett to keep 
quiet about the propane problem, which resulting in Kerns being asked to resign. Then, within the 
next two weeks, while the School District was waiting to hire a new superintendent, Kerns raised 
the Berretts' rent, harassed the Berrett' s constantly, evicted the Berretts from their home in violation 
of the lease agreement, and fired both Mr. and Mrs. Berrett. 
C. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal 
As the prevailing party, Berretts are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-2106(5) and 12-121 and reasonable costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 
Rules 40 and 41. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Finding that it does not violate Idaho's public policy fire the spouse of a whistle blower 
would frustrate the purpose of the whistle blower statute, Idaho Code§§ 6-2101, et. seq., because 
no government employee that had a spouse also working for the same employer would dare blow 
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the whistle for fear oflegal retaliation against their spouse. The Idaho Supreme Court should declare 
the termination of the spouse of a whistleblower to be against Idaho public policy. 
A three member panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that whether Mr. and Mrs. 
Berrett were terminated for blowing the whistle on a violation of the building code presents a 
genuine issue of fact for a jury. The Idaho District Court then essentially found, pursuant to the 
Idaho summary judgment standard, that no reasonable person could find what the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found. This was error, and this case should be remanded for a jury trial on its 
merits. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2019. 
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